

Topic	House (America COMPETES Act)	Senate (USICA)
<p><b>INNOVATION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.</b> The House's COMPETES Act and the Senate's USICA are largely the same with respect to the level of funding for the implementation of the CHIPS for America Act and the creation of a CHIPS for America Fund. In addition, they both provide the same level of funding toward the CHIPS Incentive Programs created by the Fund and support the establishment of similar semiconductor-focused entities and initiatives. One notable difference is that the COMPETES Act also authorizes funding to support critical components used in the production of many automobiles, consumer electronics and defense systems.</p> <p>On supply chains, both bills establish a Critical Supply Chain Resilience Program within the Department of Commerce and provide equal levels of funding for the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund. The House bill takes several additional steps to manage and monitor supply chains by establishing several additional programs and agencies at the Department of Commerce.</p>		
National Science Foundation	<p>Contains the National Science Foundation (NSF) for the Future Act, which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes a new Director for Science and Engineering Solutions responsible for accelerating research and development on issues related to cybersecurity, climate change, and STEM education;</li> <li>Increases NSF funding overall and includes funding for investments in research-enabling infrastructure; and</li> <li>Contains funding for STEM education from pre-K to graduate students.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes a new Directorate of Technology and Innovation at the NSF for research and technological development in key technology areas like AI and quantum science. The directorate would receive about \$30 billion over five years.</li> <li>Authorizes \$52 billion over five years for existing NSF activities, such as precision agriculture, rural STEM education and critical minerals, among other things.</li> </ul>
Department of Energy	<p>Contains the Department of Energy (DOE) Science for the Future Act, which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authorizes funding for the Department of Energy's Office of Science, which is responsible for research facilities;</li> <li>Authorizes funding to combat climate change; and</li> <li>Educates and prepares a generation of diverse clean energy researchers and scientists.</li> </ul>	Authorizes \$17 billion over five years for DOE research and development in key technology areas.
National Institute of Standards and Technology	Contains the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the Future Act, which:	Provides NIST with cybersecurity assistance for universities.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Authorizes funding for research on artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, privacy;</li> <li>• Authorizes funding for the Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership, which provides financial assistance to U.S. manufacturers; and</li> <li>• Supports NIST activities to address cyber vulnerabilities.</li> </ul>	
Semiconductors (CHIPS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides \$52 billion over five years for the CHIPS for America Act, of which \$50.2 billion goes toward creating a CHIPS for America Fund.</li> <li>• Within the Chips for America Fund, \$39 billion over five years is allocated to CHIPS Incentive Programs, including the expansion of the Manufacturing USA Program and the establishment of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ A National Semiconductor Technology Center</li> <li>◦ An advanced packaging R&amp;D program</li> </ul> </li> <li>• \$2 billion is authorized to create a CHIPS Defense Fund</li> <li>• Establishes and provides \$500 million over five years for the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund</li> <li>• Authorizes \$2 billion to support critical components in the production of many automobiles, consumer electronics and defense systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides \$52 billion over five years for the CHIPS for America Act, of which \$49.5 billion goes toward creating a CHIPS for America Fund.</li> <li>• Within the Chips for America Fund, \$39 billion over five years is allocated to CHIPS Incentive Programs, including the establishment of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ A National Semiconductor Technology Center</li> <li>◦ The National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program</li> </ul> </li> <li>• \$2 billion is authorized for the production of legacy chips</li> <li>• \$2 billion is authorized to create a CHIPS Defense Fund</li> <li>• Establishes and provides \$500 million over five years for the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund</li> </ul>
Supply Chains	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishes within the Department of Commerce:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes the Endless Frontiers Act, which would establish within the Department of</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ A Critical Supply Chain Monitoring Program</li> <li>○ A Critical Supply Chain Resilience Program</li> <li>○ A Supply Chain Resiliency and Crisis Response Office</li> <li>• Requires the Department of Commerce to develop a strategy to support the resilience, diversity, security, and strength of supply chains</li> <li>• Establishes a national supply chain database at MEP to track disruptions in U.S. supply chains</li> <li>• Provides \$1.5 billion in FY22 for the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund</li> <li>• Expands the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program to fund activities including the promotion of supply chain resiliency</li> <li>• Creates a fund to carry out and secure semiconductor supply chain activities</li> </ul>	<p>Commerce a Critical Supply Chain Resilience Program</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes the Safeguarding American Innovation Act, which would require regular National Risk Assessments and the creation of a Cyber Response and Recovery Fund</li> <li>• Includes the Telecommunications Supply Chain Diversity Promotion Act to promote communications supply chain diversity</li> <li>• Provides \$1.5 billion in FY22 for the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund</li> <li>• Expands the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program to fund activities including the promotion of supply chain resiliency</li> <li>• Incentivizes re-shoring of the full PPE supply chain</li> </ul>
<p><b>TELECOMMUNICATIONS.</b> The America COMPETES Act and USICA largely address many of the same issues pertaining to telecommunications policy. For instance, both address Open Radio Access Networks, next generation or 6G, American wireless leadership globally and ways to develop the domestic telecommunications workforce primarily through education. Both generally take a soft approach to 6G and global U.S. leadership on wireless standards-setting, for instance, by asking for agency reports and expressing a sense of Congress. The two are also largely aligned on bolstering the telecommunications workforce through STEM education, although the House emphasizes diversity more than the Senate. The two are more forward leaning on Open Radio Access Network issues, however, and take a more proactive approach with industry by promoting grant programs and establishing research testbeds.</p>		
Open Radio Access Network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directs the Department of Commerce to provide technical assistance to small communications network providers to raise</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Authorizes \$500 million for an Open RAN &amp; CHIPS for America International Technology Security</li> </ul>

	<p>awareness of Open Radio Access Network (RAN) networks and architectures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As part of this, the Department of Commerce would also be required to increase awareness about the Wireless Supply Chain innovation Grant Program, which awards grants for the deployment and use of Open RAN.</li> </ul>	<p>and Innovation Fund, which would allow for coordination with allies to support international information and communications technology security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Directs the Department of Commerce to establish an applied research Open RAN architecture testbed.</li> <li>Directs the Department of Commerce to establish a grant program to encourage U.S.-based private sector entities to participate in international standards-setting bodies.</li> </ul>
Next Generation	Directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a 6G Task Force to submit recommendations to Congress on 6G wireless technology, including the status of industry-led standards-setting bodies in 6G and the potential benefits and challenges to 6G.	Establishes a sense of Congress on the importance of NASA continuing to invest in research and development on optical communications and quantum encryption capabilities.
U.S. Wireless Leadership	Directs the Department of Commerce to encourage companies to participate in standards-setting bodies—such as the International Organization for Standardization, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.	Directs the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information to explore ways in which the U.S. could improve its participation in telecommunications standardization activities.
Telecommunications Workforce	Contains the Improving Minority Participation and Careers Telecommunications Act (IMPACT), which would authorize \$100 million over six years for HBCUs and MSIs to develop training programs and apprenticeships to prepare students for the telecommunications workforce.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes a grant program for telecommunications workforce training. The fund would be dedicated to employ faculty, recruitment and student support.</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Also authorizes \$100 million over five years.</li> </ul>
<p><b>FOREIGN AFFAIRS.</b> The America COMPETES Act and USICA both focus significantly on addressing Chinese activities both within its borders and around the globe. They also both include similar provisions on Hong Kong and Taiwan. While both bills contain several similar provisions to combat Chinese influence, the Senate bill takes several additional steps, such as mandating the creation of a Countering Chinese Influence Fund that would be headed by an Assistant Secretary of State and requiring the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review certain foreign gifts and contracts to universities coming from China or aligned entities. The House bill uniquely includes a sense of Congress expressing the need for U.S.-China cooperation on climate change, and calls for the establishment of an entity to fund alternatives to Confucius Institutes.</p> <p>Aside from a solely China-focused components, both bills contain several similar regional and topical provisions too, such as requiring the development of a strategy to combat Chinese influence in the Middle East, establishing regional forums like a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group and Oceania Security Dialogue, and authorizing equal levels of funding for State Department International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance in the Indo-Pacific region and in Latin America and the Caribbean.</p> <p>There are several notable differences between the two bills. For example, the House version expresses a sense of Congress that China is violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, while the Senate bill calls on the DNI to report and brief on China-Iran cooperation. Other differences between the two bills largely result in USICA taking a more direct targeting of China. For example, while both call for the U.S. to counter Chinese influence in the Middle East, the Senate's USICA additionally requires the president to report to Congress on China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the region. In addition, USICA establishes the Caribbean Energy Initiative as an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. The House version takes a more diplomacy-focused approach that doesn't always directly name China. For example, the House bill seeks to boost State Department personnel and funding in the Indo-Pacific and mandates the creation of new people-to-people programs to advance U.S. foreign policy goals and promote U.S. national security interests and values.</p>		
The People's Republic of China (PRC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successful execution of the policy requires actions such as coordination with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC</li> <li>Climate change requires cooperation between the United States and China and encourages both to work together to address it</li> </ul> </li> <li>Authorizes \$90 million over six years for a State Department program to allow U.S. embassies to hire contractors to assist U.S. persons and businesses with supply chain management issues related to China</li> <li>Requires development of a U.S. strategy to counteract Chinese assistance and financing to foreign governments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Authorizes \$1.5 billion over five years for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requires the Secretary of State to designate an Assistant Secretary to manage the Fund</li> </ul> </li> <li>Authorizes \$75 million over five years for a State Department program to allow U.S. embassies to hire contractors to assist U.S. persons and businesses with supply</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directs the Secretary of State and Attorney General to report on U.S. government efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking</li> <li>• Establishes the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language to fund alternatives to Confucius Institutes</li> <li>• Presents a statement of policy with respect to PRC claims in the South China Sea</li> </ul> <p><i>Hong Kong:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Authorizes \$10 million for the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to promote democracy in Hong Kong</li> </ul> <p><i>Taiwan:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides a statement of policy reiterating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan</li> <li>• Includes the Taiwan Peace and Stability Act</li> <li>• Includes the Taiwan International Solidarity Act</li> </ul>	<p>chain management issues related to China</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confronts China's malign political influence and predatory economic practices by requiring CFIUS to review certain foreign gifts and contracts to universities in order to combat Chinese influence campaigns</li> <li>• Directs the Secretary of State and Attorney General to report on U.S. government efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking</li> <li>• Creates new transparency requirements and protections related to Confucius Institutes</li> <li>• Requires a report from USAID on PRC investments in foreign energy development</li> <li>• Amends Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 to require the imposition of sanctions for serious human right abuses in Xinjiang</li> <li>• Requires the director of the CIA, in consultation with the Secretary of State and other relevant officials, to submit a report to Congress on the corruption and corrupt activities of senior PRC officials</li> <li>• States that it is U.S. policy to pursue arms control negotiations with the PRC</li> </ul>
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Middle East and North Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ China is upgrading its influence in the region</li> <li>◦ China's violation of U.S. sanctions on Iran undermine U.S. efforts to compel Iran to abandon its malign activities</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Requires the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a strategy for countering and limiting Chinese influence in and access to the region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should compete with CCP influence in the region and prioritize economic opportunity, rule of law and other issues as key engagement areas</li> <li>• Requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with USAID and other appropriate federal agencies, submit to Congress a strategy for countering and limiting PRC influence in, and access to the region</li> <li>• Requires the president to submit to Congress</li> </ul>

		<p>a report on China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the region</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directs the Director of National Intelligence to report and brief on cooperation between China and Iran</li> </ul>
Indo-Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Successful execution of the policy requires U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific</li> <li>○ Congress condemns the use of force to impede freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region</li> <li>○ Reaffirms U.S. support for the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India</li> <li>○ The U.S. should work with regional allies to counter Chinese influence</li> <li>○ The U.S. has benefited from its participation in APEC and should announce its interest to host APEC in 2023</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Directs the Secretary of State to enter negotiations with Japan, Australia, and India to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group</li> <li>• Establishes an Oceania Security Dialogue</li> <li>• Calls for an increase of State Department personnel and resources to the Indo-Pacific Region</li> <li>• Authorizes \$225 million over five years for State Department International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance in the Indo-Pacific region</li> <li>• Directs the president to submit a strategy for how the U.S. will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia in managing relations with China</li> <li>• Directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Defense Department and USAID, to develop a multiyear strategy for U.S.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Reaffirms U.S. support for the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India</li> <li>○ The U.S. has benefited from its participation in APEC and should announce its interest to host APEC in 2023</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Increases U.S. strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific and prioritizes alliances, partnerships and U.S. global leadership</li> <li>• Directs the Secretary of State to enter negotiations with Japan, Australia, and India to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group</li> <li>• Establishes an Oceania Security Dialogue</li> <li>• Authorizes \$225 million over five years for State Department International Military Education and</li> </ul>



	engagement to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean region	<p>Training (IMET) assistance in the Indo-Pacific region</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directs the President to submit a strategy for how the U.S. will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia in managing relations with China</li> </ul>
U.S. Global Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ The president should initiate an agenda at the G7 and G20 on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Calls on the president to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop alternatives to the PRC's BRI</li> <li>• Authorizes \$500 million for the United States Agency for Global Media for ongoing and new programs to support independent media and counter disinformation</li> <li>• Authorizes \$67.5 million over five years to the Department of State for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program for Latin America and the Caribbean</li> <li>• Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury to report to Congress on the benefits from U.S. global financial leadership to U.S. foreign policy</li> <li>• Creates new people-to-people programs to advance U.S. foreign policy goals and promote U.S. national security interests and values</li> <li>• Establishes that the policy of the U.S. is to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority, and to promote democratic governance in the region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expresses the sense of Congress that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ The president should initiate an agenda at the G7 and G20 on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Calls on the president to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop alternatives to the PRC's BRI</li> <li>• Authorizes \$500 million for the United States Agency for Global Media for ongoing and new programs to support independent media and counter disinformation</li> <li>• Authorizes \$67.5 million over five years to the Department of State for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program for Latin America and the Caribbean</li> </ul>

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