It’s Giving … California: An Updated Roadmap for Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Motion Practice

Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes protect defendants against meritless, retaliatory lawsuits that are based on communications exercising certain First Amendment rights. While Nevada’s law, NRS 41.635–41.670, is modeled after California’s, there are some significant differences in the statutory language used and how courts interpret it. See, e.g., Kosor v. Olympia Cos., LLC, 136 Nev. 705, 478 P.3d 390 (2020).

Those differences notwithstanding, a recent ruling from Nevada’s high court pushes the statute’s resemblance to its West Coast progenitor even further.

In a significant opinion issued May 14, 2026, Rosenbrook v. Lloyd, 142 Nev., Adv. Op 36, ___ P.3d ___, the Nevada Supreme Court resolved two significant and unsettled questions about anti-SLAPP motion practice:

1. how courts are to analyze anti-SLAPP motions when a single cause of action rests on a mix of protected and unprotected communications; and
2. how courts are to analyze the mandatory fee and cost award for successful anti-SLAPP movants when the motion is only granted in part.

On both points, the court’s answers offer clarity—and, for those that would assert an anti-SLAPP motion, a meaningful strategic roadmap. The Supreme Court also indicated that the statutory deadline for filing such a motion is not jurisdictional in nature.

Key Context

The plaintiffs, a married couple who appeared on the reality television series 90 Day Fiancé and run a YouTube channel, sued the operators of a competing YouTube channel alleging defamation and civil conspiracy. The claims were based on a series of specific statements about the plaintiffs made in videos posted to the competing YouTube channel. The defendants moved to dismiss under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court granted the motion in its entirety and awarded attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed both rulings.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded—using the occasion to issue two important holdings and clarify the nature of the anti-SLAPP statute’s timing requirement.

The 60-Day Filing Deadline

Anti-SLAPP motions must typically be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint. But the relevant statute permits a court to extend that time for good cause. In Rosenbrook, the defendants filed their motion approximately 115 days after the original complaint was served.

The plaintiffs did not raise this issue in the district court but argued on appeal this fact rendered the motion untimely. The Nevada Supreme Court, in addressing whether the issue had been waived on appeal by not raising it below, said it would not reach the issue on the merits because it had in fact been waived. In doing so, the court said something of broader significance. Rather than a jurisdictional requirement, which would deprive a court of the power to act on an anti-SLAPP motion, the 60-day deadline is a claim-processing rule. Thus, unlike jurisdictional deadlines a failure to comply with the anti-SLAPP statute’s 60-day deadline can be waived if not timely raised even if it is mandatory.

Whether that conclusion makes sense from a policy standpoint is not without question. While anti-SLAPP statutes are intended to protect the exercise of certain First Amendment rights, they are also at tension with a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances in court. If a defendant sits on his or her anti-SLAPP rights, the most just conclusion may be that those rights have been waived instead of a rule that further diminishes petitioning rights.

Regardless, the practical takeaway is that those defending against an anti-SLAPP motion who want to challenge its timeliness must do so in the district court, or the argument is gone.

SLAPPing Down Mixed Causes of Action

On the substance, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified how courts should conduct the anti-SLAPP analysis when a complaint challenges multiple statements, some of which are protected and some of which are not.

Under NRS 41.660, the anti-SLAPP analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the moving party must establish that the claim is based on a communication falling in one of four statutory categories of protected communications and was true or made without knowledge it was false. Second, if that burden is met, the claimant must provide prima facie proof of each element of its claims that are subject to the statute.

The state Supreme Court previously held in Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 458 P. 3d 1062 (2020), that a complaint should not be dismissed in its entirety when it arises from both protected and unprotected communications—and that each challenged claim must be reviewed independently under the second prong. But Abrams did not provide a specific analytical framework for conducting that review. And while unreported dispositions of the court have indicated a willingness to follow California law on this issue, Rosenbrook formally does so and fills the gap.

Adopting California anti-SLAPP law—specifically, Bonni v. St. Joseph Health Sys., 491 P.3d 1058 (Cal. 2021))__the Supreme Court held that where a single cause of action alleges multiple factual bases (e.g., a single defamation claim that alleges multiple defamatory statements), the moving party bears the burden of identifying what communications each challenged claim rests on and how each of those acts qualifies as protected activity per the statute. Courts must then review each communication independently. If the moving party fails to satisfy the first prong as to some communications but not others, the court should only analyze the second prong as to any claims that are premised on protected communications,  not the unprotected ones. Claims based on any unprotected communications proceed through normal litigation.

Applied to the facts, the court found that the defendants failed the first prong as to four specific statements—including allegations that the plaintiffs misused a crowdfunding account, that one plaintiff called a third party a racial slur, and that the other plaintiff had killed people in Indonesia. Those statements were sufficiently specific and fact-laden that a reasonable person would interpret them as assertions of existing fact rather than mere opinion, and the defendants failed to demonstrate their truth or good-faith belief in their truth. The district court thus erred in dismissing the claims based on those four statements.

The remaining statements—consisting largely of opinions and statements the defendants supported with sworn declarations—survived the first prong, and the court held the plaintiffs had not shown actual malice sufficient to satisfy the second prong on those statements. Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP motion was affirmed on the remaining statements, but reversed on the four unprotected statements, which were remanded to proceed through normal litigation.

Attorney Fees for Partially Successful Anti-SLAPP Efforts

Because it split the baby on the claims in the Anti-SLAPP motion, the Nevada Supreme Court also addressed the framework for mandatory attorney fee awards under NRS 41.670 when an anti-SLAPP motion succeeds only in part.

Again adopting the approach developed by California courts, the court held that a party need not succeed on every challenged claim to be a prevailing party for the purpose of fees. But fees awarded must be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way. While California courts are limited to using the lodestar approach under this framework, the Nevada Supreme Court made clear that lower courts may use any rationally designed calculation methodology.

Relevant factors to the analysis include how the motion advanced the defendant’s litigation posture, whether the same factual allegations remain, whether discovery was narrowed and the impact on future litigation strategy. For example, if a movant is only successful in having a civil conspiracy claim dismissed under the statute but the companion substantive claims remain, there is little reason to award any fees because the landscape and nature of the lawsuit would not materially change.

But this conclusion might create a conflict with Nevada anti-SLAPP precedent on the mandatory fee award. California courts are only permitted to award fees incurred with respect to the motion itself. In Nevada, though, the right is much broader. In Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 481 P. 3d 1222 (2021), the court held that while Nevada’s fee statute is similar in language to California’s, it is also ambiguous. Looking to its legislative history, the court determined there was an intent to have successful movants compensated for the costs of the entire action, not just those incurred in connection with the motion itself.

It is not clear how this rule squares with Rosenbrook. That is to say, applying Smith, even a partially successful movant should be awarded all of their fees, but that is expressly foreclosed by Rosenbrook. This is likely to be an area of continued fee litigation in anti-SLAPP motion practice.

Main Takeaways

Rosenbrook brings Nevada’s anti-SLAPP law closer in line with California’s, despite certain statutory differences, and provides some key insight for future motion practice.

Anti-SLAPP movants should take care to study claims they believe are subject to the statute’s protections. Each communication alleged in the complaint should be analyzed separately. Sweeping motions that treat all statements as a single undifferentiated mass risk denial or reversal. Movants should also consider how much the case will change based on their best-case scenario—if the landscape will not be materially altered, the fees incurred in achieving limited success may not be fully or at all recoverable.

For those defending such motions, if they are filed outside the 60-day window, object immediately and preserve the issue in the district court. Silence will amount to waiver. At the same time, Rosenbrook confirms that not all statements are created equal—courts must evaluate each one. To limit the scope of anti-SLAPP applicability, those asserting claims would be wise to consider whether they can properly allege multiple statements or grounds for liability under one claim versus separate claims based on each (e.g., one defamation claim based on multiple statements instead of separate claims per each statement).

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This document is intended to provide you with general information regarding Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes and related case law. The contents of this document are not intended to provide specific legal advice. If you have any questions about the contents of this document or if you need legal advice as to an issue, please contact the attorneys listed or your regular Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP attorney. This communication may be considered advertising in some jurisdictions.