“Liberation Day”– Trump Announces Reciprocal Tariffs, Ends De Minimis Treatment for China
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“Liberation Day”– Trump Announces Reciprocal Tariffs, Ends De Minimis Treatment for China

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Current State of Play – Trump Pauses Reciprocal Tariffs, Raises Tariff on China

UPDATED, April 10, 11:30 a.m. EDT

 

On April 9, President Donald Trump signed an executive order (EO) to (1) pause the imposition of the higher country-specific reciprocal tariffs on all countries except China while leaving the broad 10% reciprocal tariff rate in effect, (2) further increase the reciprocal duty rate imposed on Chinese goods, and (3) further raise the levies imposed on Chinese goods that previously entered under the “de minimis” exception

The EO suspends the country-specific reciprocal tariffs, which went into effect on April 9 at 12:01 a.m. EDT, for all countries outlined in Annex I, except China.

  • These country-specific reciprocal tariffs (EO 14257) have been paused until 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 9, 2025.
  • The baseline across-the-board 10% tariff imposed on all countries remains in place.
  • The pause will apply to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 10, 2025.
  • Separately, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs imposed on Canada (25%), Mexico (25%) and China (20%) remain in effect.

The EO increases the reciprocal tariff imposed on Chinese goods from 84% to 125%.

  • This amended duty rate will continue to apply on top of other existing duties, including the 20% fentanyl tariffs, effectively bringing the tariff rate on Chinese goods to 145%. Select Chinese goods are also subject to Section 301 tariffs, which will further increase duty rates.
  • While President Trump indicated in an April 9 post on Truth Social that the increased reciprocal tariff would take effect “immediately,” the EO clarifies that the higher rate formally went into effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 10, 2025.
  • The exclusions to the reciprocal tariffs enumerated in EO 14257 remain in effect and are outlined below.

The EO also amends EO 14256 and increases the duty rate and fees on Chinese goods previously eligible for “de minimis.” The tariffs applied to such goods will increase from 90% to 120%.

  • The minimum fee applied per postal item entered for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on May 2, 2025, will increase to $100.
  • The fee will increase to $200 on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on June 1, 2025.

The president’s decision to pause the reciprocal tariff regime was catalyzed by a series of related events, including efforts from various impacted countries to negotiate with the United States. The White House reported that more than 70 countries have contacted U.S. officials, seeking to address U.S. economic and security concerns. Administration officials also suggested that negotiations with Japan, Vietnam and South Korea will be prioritized. In the coming weeks, the White House will likely announce a series of country-specific agreements, with President Trump reportedly stating that he is close to making his first deal during the April 10 cabinet meeting.

Conversely, China’s escalation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods pushed the president to follow through on threats to increase the reciprocal tariff imposed on Chinese goods for the third time. On April 9, shortly before the president announced the higher tariff rate on Truth Social, China’s State Council Tariff Commission announced that it would impose an 84% tariff on American goods, matching the revised U.S. reciprocal duty rate, among other retaliatory actions. China has not yet responded to the increased 125% tariff rate, but a Ministry of Commerce spokesperson suggested that China is open to talks.

Finally, markets fell precipitously in the week following the “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariff announcements, with stocks experiencing the worst single-day declines since the COVID-19 pandemic shook markets in 2020. Market tumbles began to erode congressional support for the reciprocal tariff regime as the April 9 effective date approached; the date coincided with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer’s appearance before the House Ways and Means Committee, where lawmakers of both parties questioned him on the potential impacts of the tariffs. Following the president’s announcement pausing the tariffs, markets logged their best rally since 2008. Stocks again fell Thursday after the details of the higher rates on China were confirmed.

While taking questions from reporters at an unrelated White House event on April 9, President Trump also suggested that he might consider allowing exemptions for U.S. companies hit hardest by the tariffs. This is the first indication of a possible softening of exclusions during the current Trump administration to provide businesses and consumers with relief. However, the president did not give any other details on the topic.


Trump Increases China Tariff by 50%

UPDATED, April 8, 9:00 P.M. EDT

 

On April 8, President Donald Trump signed an executive order (EO) to further increase the reciprocal duty rate imposed on Chinese goods, including those that previously qualified under the “de minimis ” exemption.

Today’s EO amends EO 14257, issued on April 2, to raise the reciprocal tariff on Chinese goods from 34% to 84%

  • This amended duty rate will continue to apply on top of other existing duties, including the 20% fentanyl tariffs, effectively bringing the tariff rate on Chinese goods to 104%. Select Chinese goods are also subject to Section 301 tariffs, which will further increase duty rates.
  • This increased reciprocal tariff will go into effect as previously scheduled on April 9 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
  • The exclusions to the reciprocal tariffs enumerated in EO 14257 remain in effect and are outlined below.

The EO also amends EO 14256 and increases the duty rate and fees on Chinese goods previously eligible for “de minimis.” The tariff applied to such goods will increase from 30% to 90%.

  • The minimum fee applied per postal item entered for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on May 2, 2025, will increase to $75.
  • The fee will increase to $150 on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on June 1, 2025.

These changes are a response to the April 4 announcement from China’s State Council Tariff Commission that it would impose a 34% tariff on American goods, matching the original U.S. reciprocal duty rate, among other retaliatory actions. The move marked a clear escalation in the conflict between the United States and China, and President Trump swiftly threatened to increase the reciprocal tariffs.

While the standoff with China continues, the White House is currently in talks with some of the other nations affected by the reciprocal tariff regime, including South Korea, Japan and Italy.

Congressional Republicans have had a mixed reaction to the administration’s policies, with some pushing back against the tariffs. However, leadership remains firmly behind the president. This evening, Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) said that progress on the tariffs will not happen overnight, urging members to be patient. Thune added, “[b]ut clearly, any progress they can show, demonstrate concessions that have been made, progress against the curve with respect to those deals, I think everybody’s going to … view that as a positive step forward.”


TRUMP ANNOUNCES RECIPROCAL TARIFFS, ENDS DE MINIMIS TREATMENT FOR CHINA

PUBLISHED AND UPDATED, April 3

 

On April 2, President Donald Trump issued a series of executive orders (EOs) to impose reciprocal tariffs on select countries and revoke China’s eligibility for the de minimis exemption. The long-previewed actions fulfill a key campaign promise and build on the president’s efforts to reform U.S. trade policy to address trade imbalances and unfair trade practices.

The revocation of China’s eligibility for the de minimis trade privilege ends the previously imposed pause on the action, and the EO outlines a structure for the imposition of duties on impacted shipments from China.

 

Executive Order Imposing Reciprocal and Baseline Tariffs (Executive Order, Fact Sheet)

  • Imposed Under IEEPA. The president invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S. Code § 1701) to levy the reciprocal tariffs, citing “conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits.” IEEPA was also the mechanism used to impose the existing fentanyl- and immigration-based tariffs levied on Mexico, Canada and China in February.
  • Initial 10% Tariff. Starting on April 5 at 12:01 a.m. EDT, the EO imposes a baseline across-the-board 10% tariff on all countries; as noted below, these are imposed on top of all existing duty rates with the exception of goods from Mexico and Canada.
  • Country-Specific Tariff Rates. Starting on April 9 at 12:01 a.m. EDT, a country-specific reciprocal tariff regime will replace the baseline 10% tariffs for certain countries. The reciprocal tariffs regime effectively identifies a tariff charged to the United States by a specific country that includes “currency manipulation and trade barriers”; that rate is halved to determine the “discounted reciprocal tariff” that the United States will impose on the country on April 9. Country-specific rates are outlined in Annex I.
    • After the EO’s release, the White House later confirmed that the reciprocal tariffs are based on the large trade deficits these countries run with the United States; trade analysts argue that the formula is simply the trade deficit with a specific country divided by the country’s exports to the United States. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) subsequently released a methodology for calculating reciprocal tariffs, indicating that “the tariff rates that would drive bilateral trade deficits to zero were computed.”
  • Exemptions. The reciprocal/baseline tariff regime currently does not apply to the following
    • Services. Reciprocal tariffs currently do not apply to services contracts (e.g., professional services) or similar arrangements. The administration’s focus on goods over services reflects President Trump’s broader goal of revitalizing U.S. manufacturing.
    • Canada and Mexico. The two countries are not subject to the reciprocal or baseline tariffs. For both nations, the existing fentanyl-based tariffs — and United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemptions — continue to apply. If the fentanyl-based tariffs are revoked, the reciprocal EO states that non-USMCA goods will be subject to a 12% tariff.
    • Steel, aluminum, autos and other sectors subject to current or future Section 232 “Reshoring” tariffs. The EO exempts products subject to current and future sector-specific “reshoring” tariffs implemented under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This currently includes steel, aluminum and autos. Copper, pharmaceuticals, lumber and semiconductors are also not subject to these tariffs, heavily implying that they will be subject tariffs under Section 232 in the future.  The EO also states that other goods subjected to Section 232 tariffs in the future will be exempted from these reciprocal/baseline tariffs.
    • Annex II. The EO also exempts goods listed in an “Annex II.” These are largely agricultural, pharmaceutical and industrial inputs.
  • Layering Existing Tariffs. The reciprocal tariffs will be applied in addition to all existing duty rates on foreign imports. For example, a 20% tariff is in effect on all goods imported from China. Thus, the minimum duty rate applied to Chinese imports on April 9 will be 54%. Select Chinese goods are also subject to Section 301 tariffs, which will further increase duty rates.
  • Outlook. The secretary of commerce and USTR can recommend additional action if the tariffs are not considered effective in resolving the “emergency conditions,” and the tariffs can also be altered by the president via additional executive actions.

Initial Analysis

The list of countries facing reciprocal tariffs is much more expansive than anticipated, far exceeding the top 10 to 15 countries with which the United States has the largest trade deficit.

As indicated above, there are notable exemptions to the reciprocal tariffs. Canada and Mexico will not be subject to reciprocal tariffs but will remain subject to tariffs related to the influx of fentanyl importations. On March 6, President Trump signed an executive order temporarily exempting goods that satisfy USMCA rules of origin or that claim and qualify for USMCA preference, and that exemption also remains in effect.

As noted above, select products that are subject to or expected to face separate tariffs are also exempt from the reciprocal duty rate: steel, aluminum, automobiles and related parts, copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and lumber.

President Trump’s latest actions mark a shift in global trade relations. The imposition of broad tariffs along with record-high duty rates increases the likelihood of retaliatory action. The reciprocal tariff EO notes that President Trump may modify the tariff rates based on targeted nations’ retaliatory actions. Several countries have already indicated that they plan to target U.S. services through such action, which could threaten a range of sectors.

 

Executive Order Revoking De Minimis Treatment for Chinese Goods (Executive Order, Fact Sheet)

  • Previous Revocation. President Trump initially revoked China’s de minimis eligibility in a Feb. 1, 2025 executive order (EO) but later paused the revocation, citing the absence of “adequate systems.” The secretary of commerce has notified the president that “adequate systems are now in place to process and collect tariff revenue.”
  • Effective Date. Chinese goods, excluding articles sent through the international postal network, valued up to $800 will no longer be able to enter the United States duty-free on May 2, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
  • Tariff Rates. A tariff amounting to 30% of the value of Chinese goods will be applied. At a minimum, a $25 import fee will be applied per postal item entered for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on May 2, 2025. The fee will increase to $50 on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on June 1, 2025.
  • Layering Existing Tariffs. The tariffs will apply in addition to all existing duties on Chinese goods.

Initial Analysis

The revocation of China’s de minimis eligibility is a long-awaited action. There is bipartisan consensus that de minimis treatment is used to evade tariffs and export illicit goods to the United States. Unlike the reciprocal tariffs, which may evolve over the next several months, this EO is likely to remain in effect in the long term.

 

Outlook for Tariff Actions

Today’s executive actions do not mark the end of tariff announcements, and the duties outlined in the chart below may shift in response to negotiations between the United States and impacted companies over the coming days and weeks. On March 24, President Donald Trump issued an executive order (EO) to direct the secretary of state, in consultation with other agency heads, to impose a 25% tariff on all goods from countries that import Venezuelan oil “directly or indirectly.” The imposition of tariffs will be based on an investigation conducted by the secretary of commerce; however, the secretary of state is granted the authority to impose tariffs “in his discretion.” The tariffs will go into effect on or after April 2, leaving the door open for increased duties.

In addition, President Trump has indicated he will announce sector-specific tariffs intended to force manufacturers to shift production of targeted goods to the United States. These tariffs will target specific goods or industries, like pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, and are expected in the coming months. The sector-specific tariffs will likely be levied under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and either amend an existing tariff or direct a Commerce Department investigation.

Below outlines the tariffs charged by each country on U.S. goods and the reciprocal tariffs levied by the United States, as displayed by President Trump during his announcement:

Reciprocal Tariffs

Country

Tariff Charged on U.S. Exports, Including Non-Tariff Barriers

U.S. “Discounted Reciprocal Tariffs”

China

67%

34%

European Union

39%

20%

Vietnam

90%

46%

Taiwan

64%

32%

Japan

46%

24%

India

52%

27%

South Korea

50%

26%

Thailand

72%

37%

Switzerland

61%

32%

Indonesia

64%

32%

Malaysia

47%

24%

Cambodia

97%

49%

United Kingdom

10%

10%

South Africa

60%

31%

Brazil

10%

10%

Bangladesh

74%

37%

Singapore

10%

10%

Israel

33%

17%

Philippines

34%

17%

Chile

10%

10%

Australia

10%

10%

Pakistan

58%

30%

Turkey

10%

10%

Sri Lanka

88%

44%

Colombia

10%

10%

Peru

10%

10%

Nicaragua

36%

19%

Norway

30%

16%

Costa Rica

17%

10%

Jordan

40%

20%

Dominican Republic

10%

10%

United Arab Emirates

10%

10%

New Zealand

20%

10%

Argentina

10%

10%

Ecuador

12%

10%

Guatemala

10%

10%

Honduras

10%

10%

Madagascar

93%

47%

Myanmar

88%

45%

Tunisia

55%

28%

Kazakhstan

54%

27%

Serbia

74%

38%

Egypt

10%

10%

Saudi Arabia

10%

10%

El Salvador

10%

10%

Côte d'Ivoire

41%

21%

Laos

95%

48%

Botswana

74%

38%

Trinidad and Tobago

12%

10%

Morocco

10%

10%

Algeria

59%

30%

Oman

10%

10%

Uruguay

10%

10%

Bahamas

10%

10%

Lesotho

99%

50%

Ukraine

10%

10%

Bahrain

10%

10%

Qatar

10%

10%

Mauritius

80%

40%

Fiji

63%

32%

Iceland

10%

10%

Kenya

10%

10%

Liechtenstein

73%

37%

Guyana

76%

38%

Haiti

10%

10%

Bosnia and Herzegovina

70%

36%

Nigeria

27%

14%

Namibia

42%

21%

Brunei

47%

24%

Bolivia

20%

10%

Panama

10%

10%

Venezuela

29%

15%

North Macedonia

65%

33%

Ethiopia

10%

10%

Ghana

17%

10%

Moldova

61%

31%

Angola

63%

32%

Democratic Republic of the Congo

22%

11%

Jamaica

10%

10%

Mozambique

31%

16%

Paraguay

10%

10%

Zambia

33%

17%

Lebanon

10%

10%

Tanzania

10%

10%

Iraq

78%

39%

Georgia

10%

10%

Senegal

10%

10%

Azerbaijan

10%

10%

Cameroon

22%

12%

Uganda

20%

10%

Albania

10%

10%

Armenia

10%

10%

Nepal

10%

10%

Sint Maarten

10%

10%

Falkland Islands

82%

42%

Gabon

10%

10%

Kuwait

10%

10%

Togo

10%

10%

Suriname

10%

10%

Belize

10%

10%

Papua New Guinea

15%

10%

Malawi

34%

18%

Liberia

10%

10%

British Virgin Islands

10%

10%

Afghanistan

49%

10%

Zimbabwe

35%

18%

Benin

10%

10%

Barbados

10%

10%

Monaco

10%

10%

Syria

81%

41%

Uzbekistan

10%

10%

Republic of the Congo

10%

10%

Djibouti

10%

10%

French Polynesia

10%

10%

Cayman Islands

10%

10%

Kosovo

10%

10%

Curaçao

10%

10%

Vanuatu

44%

23%

Rwanda

10%

10%

Sierra Leone

10%

10%

Mongolia

10%

10%

San Marino

10%

10%

Antigua and Barbuda

10%

10%

Bermuda

10%

10%

Eswatini

10%

10%

Marshall Islands

10%

10%

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

99%

50%

Saint Kitts and Nevis

10%

10%

Turkmenistan

10%

10%

Grenada

10%

10%

Sudan

10%

10%

Turks and Caicos Islands

10%

10%

Aruba

10%

10%

Montenegro

10%

10%

Saint Helena

15%

10%

Kyrgyzstan

10%

10%

Yemen

10%

10%

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

10%

10%

Saint Lucia

10%

10%

Nauru

59%

30%

Equatorial Guinea

25%

13%

Iran

10%

10%

Libya

61%

31%

Samoa

10%

10%

Guinea

10%

10%

Timor-Leste

10%

10%

Montserrat

10%

10%

Chad

26%

13%

Mali

10%

10%

Maldives

10%

10%

Tajikistan

10%

10%

Cabo Verde

10%

10%

Burundi

10%

10%

Guadeloupe

10%

10%

Bhutan

10%

10%

Martinique

10%

10%

Tonga

10%

10%

Mauritania

10%

10%

Dominica

10%

10%

Micronesia

10%

10%

Gambia

10%

10%

French Guiana

10%

10%

Christmas Island

10%

10%

Andorra

10%

10%

Central Africa Republic

10%

10%

Solomon Islands

10%

10%

Mayotte

10%

10%

Anguilla

10%

10%

Cocos Islands

10%

10%

Eritrea

10%

10%

Cook Islands

10%

10%

South Sudan

10%

10%

Comoros

10%

10%

Kiribati

10%

10%

São Tomé and Príncipe

10%

10%

Norfolk Island

58%

29%

Gibraltar

10%

10%

Tuvalu

10%

10%

British Indian Ocean Territory

10%

10%

Tokelau

10%

10%

Guinea-Bissau

10%

10%

Svalbard and Jan Mayen

10%

10%

Heard and McDonal Islands

10%

10%

Reunion

73%

37%


THIS DOCUMENT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE YOU WITH GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S TRADE POLICY. THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC LEGAL ADVICE. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT OR IF YOU NEED LEGAL ADVICE AS TO AN ISSUE, PLEASE CONTACT THE ATTORNEYS LISTED OR YOUR REGULAR BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP ATTORNEY. THIS COMMUNICATION MAY BE CONSIDERED ADVERTISING IN SOME JURISDICTIONS.

 

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