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Navigating the Trump Administration’s Tariffs – State of Play and Key Dates

Brownstein Client Alert, March 11, 2025

Tariffs are a vital part of the Trump administration’s economic and international policy agenda. Less than two months into the new administration, the president has imposed new tariffs on major trading partners, expanded product-specific tariffs to address national security concerns and proposed a new system of reciprocal tariffs that would completely reform the current World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trading system.

This alert takes a closer look at the various types of tariffs proposed by the administration to date and outlines key upcoming dates to provide insight into the administration’s next steps.

Three Types of Tariffs

To date, the tariffs discussed by the administration can be placed in the following three buckets.

“Fentanyl Tariffs” – Tariffs imposed through a novel use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), in addition to existing authorities under the National Emergencies Act (NEA), Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 301 of title 3, United States Code. These target Mexico, Canada and China. The administration formally cited to Canada’s and Mexico’s failure to stop illicit immigration and shipments of deadly drugs such as fentanyl into the United States as the reason for imposing the tariffs. With regard to China, the administration cited only to the influx of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.

“Reshoring Tariffs” – Tariffs intended to force manufacturers to shift production of targeted goods to the United States. These tariffs target specific goods or industries, like aluminum and copper, and additional targeted tariffs, potentially on pharmaceuticals and other goods, are expected in the coming months. These are levied under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and either amend an existing tariff or direct a Commerce Department investigation.

“Reciprocal Tariffs” – Tariffs expected to target specific countries based on tariffs imposed on U.S. exports as well as other non-tariff trade barriers that undermine U.S. market access abroad. Initial recommendations for such tariffs will be made by the Secretary of Commerce and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on April 1 following the completion of a presidentially-directed review. The president said he intends to announce the tariffs on April 2.

“Fentanyl Tariffs”

CURRENT STATUS – Mexico and Canada

The 25% tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada and 10% tariff on Canadian energy resources took effect on March 4. However, the president signed an executive order on March 6 temporarily exempting goods that satisfy United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) rules of origin or that claim and qualify for USMCA preference. Potash that is not covered by this exemption is subject to a lowered 10% tariff. Different products follow different rules of origin under the USMCA—this includes goods being wholly obtained or produced in the territory of one or more of the USMCA parties—i.e., the United States, Canada, or Mexico.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) estimates that the tariff suspension will cover roughly 70% of imports from Mexico and Canada, though exact predictions vary. It is likely that additional goods imported into the United States from Canada and Mexico could claim and qualify for USMCA preference if importers move to do so. The order does not specify an expiration date, but administration officials said the protections will expire on April 2. The exemption announced on March 3 preserved de minimis treatment for qualifying shipments; this shields goods under $800 from the tariffs and will remain in effect until the Commerce Secretary notifies that president that “adequate systems are in place” to process the processing and collection of tariff revenue on those goods.

President Trump initially announced these tariffs on Feb. 1 in response to the flow of illegal immigrants and fentanyl into the United States. Canada and Mexico quickly announced plans for retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods. Roughly 48 hours later, President Trump announced a 30 day “pause” in the tariffs’ effective date after Mexico and Canada took steps to increase border security. Canada planned to dedicate $1.3 billion to enhance border security and drug enforcement and authorized $200 million to combat organized crime and the importation of fentanyl. Mexico deployed 10,000 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border. In late February, President Trump said the countries had not made sufficient progress on slowing the movement of illegal immigrants and fentanyl, and he confirmed that the tariffs would go into effect on March 4. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on March 2 that Mexico had offered to match U.S. tariffs on China, suggesting that it “would be a very good start” if Canada did the same, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick repeatedly speculated that the tariffs may be paused or narrowed. As noted above, the tariffs did take effect on March 4 but exemptions were announced on March 3 for goods that receive de minimis treatment, on March 5 for U.S. automakers whose goods comply with USMCA content requirements, and on March 6 for potash and goods that comply with USMCA.

Officials from Mexico and Canada assume that President Trump’s ultimate goal has more to do with economics than national security and have publicly signaled their openness to renegotiate the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade agreement early, before its review mechanism comes due July 2026. The lack of an exclusion process under the IEEPA tariffs enhances the pressure for both countries to negotiate.

CURRENT STATUS – China

A 20% tariff is in effect on goods imported from China. The tariff was imposed at 10% on Feb. 4 and increased to 20% on March 3. Goods that qualify for de minimis treatment are protected, but there are no other exemptions to the tariff on Chinese goods.

The original 10% tariff on Chinese goods was announced on Feb. 1 and took effect on Feb. 4. De minimis treatment was subsequently allowed for qualifying Chinese goods. China quickly announced that it would challenge the tariffs at the World Trade Organization, a largely symbolic move, and the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that tariffs would be imposed on select American exports beginning on Feb. 10; the 15% tariffs targets coal and liquefied natural gas, and the 10% tariffs impact crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement automobiles, and pickup trucks. China also initiated an antitrust investigation on Google, expanded export controls on critical minerals, and designated several American companies to its Unreliable Entity List.

There is bipartisan concern that China is an economic and national security threat. Tariffs on China will be a long-term tool to limit China’s growing dominance in strategic sectors. However, President Trump has made clear that he hope to reach a deal with China, and a sustainable tariff regime will likely need to incorporate an exclusion process in some form.

“Reshoring Tariffs”

Unlike the initial drug and immigration-backed tariffs threatened or imposed by the second Trump administration, the goal of these tariffs is not to prompt concessions from trading partners. Instead, these actions are aimed at revitalizing a range of domestic industries and bolstering the administration’s broader economic priorities. In the case of steel and aluminum for example, the specified goal is to achieve “sustainable capacity utilization of at least 80%” in the United States. Future industry-focused tariffs will likely also be aimed at increasing production of the targeted products in the United States.

To date, all of the tariffs in this bucket have been directed under traditional tariff authorities, specifically by revising existing Section 232 tariffs or directing a new Section 232 investigation. When revising existing 232 tariffs, the Trump administration has also revoked specific country- and product-based exemptions granted under the first Trump and Biden administrations; the new Trump White House criticized the latter for “weaken[ing] the effectiveness of the program.” The following reshoring-focused tariffs have been announced so far:

*Import(s)*	*Announced*	*State of Play*
Steel	Feb. 10, 2025	25% Tariff – Effective on March 12. Existing exemptions were also revoked. President Trump similarly imposed a 25% tariff on steel during his first administration. [Fact Sheet]
Aluminum	Feb. 11, 2025	25% Tariff – Effective on March 12. Existing exemptions were also revoked. The current tariff rate on aluminum is 10%. [Fact Sheet]
Copper	Feb. 25, 2025	Under investigation – Report Due Nov. 22, 2025. Pursuant to the EO, the Secretary of Commerce is conducting a Section 232 investigation to determine whether the importation of copper undermines national security. Tariffs on copper are expected after the completion of the report. [Fact Sheet]
Timber, Lumber and Derivative Products	March 1, 2025	Under investigation – Report Due Nov. 26, 2025. Pursuant to the EO, the Secretary of Commerce is conducting a Section 232 investigation to determine whether the importation of timber, lumber and their derivative products undermines national security. Tariffs are expected after the completion of the report. [Fact Sheet]
*Pharmaceuticals,* *Semiconductors,* *Automobiles*	Possibly forthcoming	On Feb. 14, President Trump told reporters he is considering imposing a 25% tariff on automobiles as soon as April 2. He repeated these plans on Feb. 18, also indicating that similar duties would potentially be imposed on pharmaceuticals and semiconductors.

“Reciprocal Tariffs”

The administration has been driving towards a slate of “reciprocal” country-specific tariffs since the inauguration. April 2 has been repeatedly identified as the launch date, but President Trump indicated on March 7 that reciprocal tariffs on Canadian goods may be released before March 11. Like the reshoring tariffs outlined in Section II, the reciprocal tariffs are intended to advance the administration’s longer term economic priorities. These include reshoring key industries, rebalancing U.S. trade relationships, and raising revenue.

On the first day of the second administration, the president issued the America First Trade Policy Memorandum, which directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to report to the president on the following by April 1:

“…investigate the causes and implications of trade deficits and propose solutions, such as a global supplemental tariff.”
“…identify any unfair trade practices by other countries and recommend appropriate solutions.”
“…review current antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws, including transnational subsidies, cost adjustments, affiliations and ‘zeroing,’ to ensure compliance from foreign entities.”

Several other administration actions also suggest reciprocal tariffs are imminent, including:

The Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs Memorandum that the administration issued on February 13 calls for the relevant officials to recommend “reciprocal” tariffs to the president after they deliver the reports discussed above.
The Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties Memorandum, which was issued on Feb. 21, directs the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Treasury investigate whether other nations impose taxes, regulations or other barriers that unfairly discriminate against U.S. companies, notably digital service taxes (DST). The memorandum directs USTR to include its findings as well as recommended action by April 1.

At the first cabinet meeting of the new administration on Feb. 26, President Trump and Commerce Secretary Lutnick indicated that reciprocal tariffs will be imposed on April 2, just after the April 1 due date for the reports outlined above. President Trump reaffirmed this date in his March 4 joint address to Congress, saying:

“we're going to do it in April…April 2nd. Reciprocal tariffs kick in and whatever they tariff us, other countries, we will tariff them. That's reciprocal, back and forth, whatever they tax us, we will tax them. If they do non-monetary tariffs, to keep us out of their market, then we will do nonmonetary barriers to keep them out of our market.”

In recent weeks, the administration has pointed to the European Union, India, Brazil, and South Korea as potential targets. The president may also impose reciprocal tariffs on Mexico and Canada on top of the existing tariffs. On March 7, Peter Navarro, Senior Counselor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing, indicated that the reciprocal tariffs would be imposed as blanket tariffs and subject each country to a set levy based on the findings of the Commerce-USTR report. For example, President Trump has repeatedly suggested that the tariff on goods from the EU will be set at 25%. However, the same afternoon President Trump indicated that reciprocal tariffs on Canada could specifically target dairy and lumber and may be released by March 11, weeks ahead of the April 2 timeline. If the tariffs are levied through IEEPA, as done for Canada, Mexico and China, there will not be an immediate exclusion process.

Upcoming Key Dates

The president will likely continue to make tariff related announcements with little to no notice. However, the following dates provide some insight into the administration’s next steps:

DATE	SCHEDULED/EXPECTED ACTION
March 12	25% tariff on all steel imports takes effect. 25% tariff on all aluminum imports takes effect.
April 1	Reports directed by the America First Policy Memorandum and Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties Memorandum are due to the president.
April 2	An announcement of blanket reciprocal tariffs on various countries is expected. Targeted nations/entities may include the European Union, Brazil, India and South Korea, among others. An announcement of tariffs on or a Commerce Department investigation into the following industries is likely: pharmaceuticals, automobiles and semiconductors, among others. Temporary exemptions from Canada and Mexico tariffs are expected to expire.
Nov. 22	The Secretary of Commerce’s report on the importation of copper is due to the president.
Nov. 23	An announcement of tariffs on copper is likely.
Nov. 26	The Secretary of Commerce’s report on the importation of timber, lumber and their derivative products is due to the president.
Nov. 27	An announcement of tariffs on timber, lumber and their derivative products is likely.